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Playing Favorites?  





Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. famously identified a 
foundational commitment of First Amendment law as “the 
principle of free thought—not free thought for those who agree 
with us but freedom for the thought that we hate.”
1
 
In a series of cases involving abortion protesters,
2
 Justice 
Scalia accused the majority of the Court of breaching that 
fundamental constitutional commitment. He charged the Court 
with blatantly flouting existing doctrine in cases involving 
abortion protests
3
—and doing so because of bias against the 
views of abortion protesters. In a 1994 case, he said that the 
lower court decision “departs so far from the established course 
of our jurisprudence that in any other context it would have 
been regarded as a candidate for summary reversal”—“[b]ut 
the context here is abortion.”
4
 Twenty years later he repeated 
the same refrain: “Today’s opinion carries forward this Court’s 
practice of giving abortion-rights advocates a pass when it 




These two cases did not stand alone. In one intervening 
case, Scalia bitterly contended that the Court’s treatment of the 
case should come as no surprise because “[w]hat is before us, 
 
†  Sho Sato Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. 
Copyright © 2016 by Daniel A. Farber. 
 1. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654–55 (1929). 
 2. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 
703 (2000); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 
357 (1997); Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
 3. I will use the term “anti-abortion protests” to include all expressive 
activities by anti-abortion advocates at abortion clinics or the homes of clinic 
personnel, including picketing, leafleting, sidewalk counseling, and physical 
interference with access. 
 4. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 785, (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 5. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2541 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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after all, is a speech regulation directed against the opponents 
of abortion, and it therefore enjoys the benefit of the ‘ad hoc 
nullification machine’ that the Court has set in motion to push 
aside whatever doctrines of constitutional law stand in the way 
of that highly favored practice.”
6
 In a fourth abortion protest 
case, Scalia lamented that the decision was “contrary to the 
most fundamental principles of separation of powers.”
7
 
The majority did not respond in kind, but an observer 
might have wondered whether Scalia’s vehement opposition to 
abortion might not have been coloring his own view of the 
cases. Ironically, given Scalia’s accusations of partiality in the 
abortion protest cases, a 2013 statistical study concluded that 
Scalia himself was far more likely to uphold the speech rights 
of conservative speakers than liberal ones, though the study 
has been subject to some methodological criticisms.
8
 
Taking a closer look at the abortion protest cases can shed 
light on these disputes over judicial bias in First Amendment 
cases. It can also shed light on two important aspects of Scalia’s 
work: his rhetorical style, which regularly featured scathing 
attacks on the motives or competence of other Justices;
9
 and his 
insistence that his own decision-making adhered to rigorous, 
objective methods of analysis.
10
 
In reexamining the four abortion protest cases, my goal is 
not to decide whose views of the doctrinal issues were correct. 
Rather, it is to assess whether Justice Scalia or the majority 
stepped outside normal bounds in ways that might indicate 
bias. At the risk of eliminating suspense about the results of 
the inquiry, there seems to be more evidence of partiality on 
the part of Justice Scalia in these cases than on the part of his 
opponents. As a prelude to that analysis, I will begin by 
 
 6. Hill, 530 U.S. at 741 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 7. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 394. 
 8. See Todd E. Pettys, Free Expression, In-Group Bias, and the Court’s 
Conservatives: A Critique of the Epstein-Parker-Segal Study, 63 BUFFALO L. 
REV. 1, 3 (2015). As the title indicates, Pettys offers a critique of the study. He 
argues that the results are suspect due to possible coding errors by the 
authors of the study. 
 9. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A 
Critical Appraisal, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 385, 399–400 (2000). As other observers 
put it, Justice Scalia “often seems to regard his colleagues with the disdain 
that one would reserve for people considered unquestionably inferior in 
intellectual or reasoning abilities.” DAVID A. SCHULTZ & CHRISTOPHER E. 
SMITH, THE JURISPRUDENTIAL VISION OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 208 (1996). 
 10. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Scalia Myth, NY REV. OF BOOKS (Feb. 27, 
2016), http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2016/02/27/the-scalia-myth/. 
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sketching the basic First Amendment doctrines governing these 
cases. I will then turn to an in-depth examination of the four 
cases, and end with some brief thoughts about the implication 
of the findings. 
I. THE DOCTRINAL BACKDROP 
The four abortion protest cases involve disputes over the 
appropriate First Amendment standard and whether that 
standard was correctly applied. A quick tour of the relevant 
doctrine is necessary to understand these disputes. The crucial 
doctrinal distinction is between regulations of speech unrelated 
to content (the subject of Section A) and regulations based on 
content (discussed in Section B). 
A. CONTENT-NEUTRAL REGULATIONS OF EXPRESSION 
The leading case governing content speech regulations is 
United States v. O’Brien.
11
 The defendant had burned his draft 
card in front of a large crowd as a protest against the Vietnam 
War. He was convicted for willfully burning the card. The Court 
upheld the conviction, reasoning that the government needed to 
ensure that draft cards would be available when someone 
needed to check a person’s draft status. In his opinion for the 
Court, Chief Justice Warren announced the following principle: 
“[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently 
justified if it is within the constitutional power of the 
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial 
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the 
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is 
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that 
interest.”
12
 To rearrange the terms a bit, the O’Brien rule is 
that a content-neutral regulation is valid if it is narrowly 
tailored to a significant government interest. In a concurring 
opinion, Justice Harlan suggested an additional requirement, 
that the regulation avoid “entirely preventing a ‘speaker’ from 





 11. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 12. Id. at 377. 
 13. Id. at 388 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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A refinement of the O’Brien test was applied in Ward v. 
Rock Against Racism.
14
 Because of a series of noisy concerts in 
Central Park, New York City adopted an ordinance requiring 
musicians to use city sound equipment and a government 
sound technician. The Court applied the following three-part 
test: 
1. The regulation must be justified “without reference to 
the content of the regulated speech.” 
2. It must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest.” 
3. Finally, it must leave open “ample alternative channels 
for communication of the information.”
15
 
The first two elements are derived from Warren’s opinion 
in O’Brien, the third from Harlan’s concurrence. The Court 
readily concluded that the government’s interest in noise 
control was content-neutral, and that the regulation was a 
reasonable method of keeping the noise level under control. 
The Court emphasized in Ward that the “narrow tailoring” 
requirement does not require the government to use the very 
least restrictive alternative. A content-neutral regulation is not 
invalid because there is some imaginable alternative that a 
judge likes better. Rather, the government need only to show 
that its regulatory interest “would be achieved less effectively” 
without the regulation.
16
 “To be sure,” the Court added, “this 
standard does not mean that a time, place, or manner of 
regulation may burden substantially more speech than is 
necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.”
17
 
Putting these remarks together, the upshot seems to be that a 
regulation is too broad if it could achieve the government’s 
purposes effectively while covering substantially less speech. 
United States v. Grace
18
 illustrates how this approach is 
applied to demonstrations in public spaces. Grace involved a 
federal statute that prohibited leafleting or picketing on the 
sidewalks surrounding the Supreme Court.
19
 The Court 
observed that streets, sidewalks, and parks are traditionally 
considered public forums where restrictions on expressive 
 
 14. 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
 15. Id. at 791. 
 16. Id. at 799. 
 17. Id. 
 18. 461 U.S. 171 (1983). 
 19. See id. at 172, 175–76 (quoting the statute and discussing its 
interpretation). 
  
2016] PLAYING FAVORITES? 27 
 
conduct are limited to “reasonable time, place, and manner 
regulations” that are content-neutral, narrowly tailored, and 
leave open ample alternative channels of communication.
20
 
Applying this test, the Court said that a total ban on leafleting 
or picketing was too broad in the absence of any evidence that 
specific activities “in any way obstructed the sidewalks or 
access to the building, threatened injury to any person or 
property, or in any way interfered with the orderly 
administration of the building or other parts of the grounds.”
21
 
B. CONTENT-BASED RESTRICTIONS 
The Court applies a much more stringent test to speech 
restrictions that relate to content. The content distinction 
found its first clear expression in Police Department of Chicago 
v. Mosley.
22
 Mosley, a postal worker, frequently picketed a 
Chicago high school with a sign accusing the school of having a 
racial quota and practicing “black discrimination.”
23
 Seven 
months after he had started picketing, the city enacted an 
ordinance prohibiting picketing near any school just before, 
after, or during school hours.
24
 A provision exempted “the 
peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute.”
25
 
The Mosley Court struck down the ordinance based on a broad 
rule against content discrimination: “[A]bove all else, the First 
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict 
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, 
or its content.”
26
 As the Court explained, 
[G]overnment may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views 
it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less 
favored or more controversial views. And it may not select which 
issues are worth discussing or debating in public facilities. There is 
an “equality of status in the field of ideas,” and government must 
afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard. . . . 
Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based on content 




 20. Id. at 177. 
 21. Id. at 182. 
 22. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
 23. Id. at 93. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 95. 
 27. Id. at 96. 
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The Court has not always been able to agree on what 
constitutes content neutrality. In United States v. Eichman,
28
 
the Court considered a federal statute that prohibited physical 
harm to the American flag except when disposing of worn or 
soiled flags.
29
 The Court found the statute to be content-based 
nevertheless. The government’s asserted interest—to preserve 
the flag as a national symbol—was inevitably content-based, 
since it “suppresses expression out of concern for its likely 
communicative impact.”
30
 The four dissenters, led by Justice 
Stevens, insisted that the law was content-neutral since it 
applied regardless of the defendant’s intended message.
31
 
The Supreme Court has recently attempted to clarify the 
meaning of content discrimination, while indicating the 
stringency of review applied to such restrictions. In Reed v. 
Town of Gilbert,
32
 a town’s sign ordinance imposed stronger 
restrictions on signs directing people to specific locations than 
it did on some other signs, such as address signs.
33
 The Court 
offered a two-pronged definition of content discrimination. 
First, a law is content-based if the law “applies to particular 
speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message 
expressed” or because of “its function or purpose.”
34
 Second, a 
law is content-based if it was motivated by disagreement with 
particular messages or cannot be justified without respect to 
the content of some of speech it regulates.
35
 Under this test, a 
law is content-based if it actually categorizes speakers based on 
their messages or their reasons for speaking, if it was covertly 
intended to suppress certain kinds of messages, or if it can only 
be justified because much of the speech it regulates contain 
particular messages. 
Applying this test, the Court found it clear that the sign 
ordinance was content-based, since it distinguished between 
different types of signs based on their messages.
36
 That being 
so, the sign ordinance could survive only if it furthered a 
compelling governmental interest and was narrowly tailored to 
 
 28. 496 U.S. 310 (1990). 
 29. Id. at 314. 
 30. Id. at 317. 
 31. Id. at 319. 
 32. 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). 
 33. Id. at 2225. 
 34. Id. at 2227. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
  




 The ordinance failed to survive this test.
38
 Reed was 
decided after the abortion protest cases discussed in the next 
section, so it is not directly relevant to Justice Scalia’s charge 
that the Court was deviating from accepted First Amendment 
doctrine. Nevertheless, it emphasizes the importance of the 
content distinction and indicates some of the main 
considerations in applying it. 
II. THE ABORTION PROTEST CASES 
Each of the four abortion protest cases involved 
considerable factual complexity and multiple restrictions on 
protests, as well as difficult doctrinal issues. A full discussion of 
any one case would require far more space than is available 
here. The discussion will thus be limited to the key points in 
each case and consideration of possible evidence of bias. 
A. JUDICIAL INJUNCTIONS AGAINST PROTESTERS 
Madsen v. Women’s Health Center
39
 involved an injunction 
against protesters who had violated an earlier, more limited 
injunction. In an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court 
upheld a 36-foot buffer zone on a public street but struck down 
some other aspects of the injunction.
40
 The operators of a 
Florida abortion clinic initially obtained an injunction against 
the defendants from interfering with public access to the clinic 
or physically abusing people entering or leaving the clinic.
41
 
When the first injunction proved ineffective, the operators 
sought a broader injunction against the defendants, including 
an injunction against harassing doctors and clinic workers in 
their homes.
42
 The broader injunction, besides setting up the 
buffer zone, prohibited loud noises and sound amplification 
during surgical hours and prohibited the defendants from 
physically approaching anyone seeking to use the clinic without 
that person’s consent.
43
 The Court invalidated this “bubble” 
 
 37. Id. at 2231. 
 38. Id. at 2231–32. 
 39. 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
 40. Id. at 757. 
 41. Id. at 758. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 759. 
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The most basic question facing the Court was the 
appropriate standard of review. The injunction itself did not 
refer to the content of speech, so arguably the standard for 
content-neutral regulations should apply. On the other hand, 
given that the injunction was aimed only at specific speakers, it 
presented a greater opportunity for content-based motivation 
than a general law, arguably justifying strict scrutiny. Taking 
into account these opposing arguments, the majority 
compromised with an intermediate standard for review of 
injunctions, asking whether “the challenged provisions of the 




Justice Scalia argued that there was no real precedent for 
the Court’s holding, and this seems to be correct.
46
 The case 
that seemed to come closest was Carroll v. President of Princess 
Anne,
47
 in which the Court said that an injunction against 
speech “must be couched in the narrowest terms that will 
accomplish the pin-pointed objective permitted by 
constitutional mandate and the essential needs of the public 
order.”
48
 There is indeed a difference between the language 
used in Madsen and this standard—“narrowest terms” versus 
“burden no more speech than necessary,” and perhaps more 
significantly, “significant government interest” versus 
“essential needs of the public order.” So Madsen might be 
considered to dilute the Carroll formulation somewhat. On the 
other hand, Carroll could hardly be considered to have 
established a definitive standard for reviewing the substance of 
speech injunctions, because this language was dictum. The 
Carroll Court’s holding was based entirely on the procedural 
flaws in the injunction proceeding and in particular on the 
failure to allow the plaintiffs to argue for some narrowing of the 
very sweeping injunction in the case.
49
 It was relevant to the 
 
 44. Id. at 764. 
 45. Id. at 766. 
 46. Id. at 799 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 47. 393 U.S. 175 (1968). 
 48. Id. at 183. 
 49. As the Court explained: 
We need not decide the thorny problem of whether, on the facts of this 
case, an injunction against the announced rally could be justified. The 
10-day order here must be set aside because of a basic infirmity in the 
procedure by which it was obtained. It was issued ex parte, without 
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decision that some narrowing might be required by the First 
Amendment, but there was no reason for the Court to rule on 
how much narrowing was required. 
Thus, the Madsen Court could not have properly claimed to 
be simply applying settled law. Still, the fact that the Court 
had never previously ruled directly on the proper standard 
means that there was no precedent in favor of Scalia’s position 
either. And it does dispel his assertion that the Court had 
departed far from past practice, since there was no relevant 
past practice, only dictum.
50
 
Justice Scalia’s dissent devotes considerable attention to 
the facts. He spent a great deal of time describing a video and 
other evidence about the demonstrations in order to show that 
the defendant’s conduct did not justify the second injunction.
51
 
For instance, he argued that there was no evidence to support 
the finding that the original injunction had been violated.
52
 He 
also argued that the trial court had improperly found some 
other anti-abortion demonstrators to be acting “in concert” with 
the defendants and therefore bound by the injunction.
53
 
The trouble with Scalia’s arguments was not that they 
were wrong but that they were irrelevant. These issues simply 
were not before the Court. In order to obtain review in the 
Florida Supreme Court, the defendants had limited their claim 
to an argument that the injunction was invalid on its face, and 
they explicitly conceded for purposes of review that “a factual 
basis exists to grant injunctive relief.”
54
 So the question of 
whether there was a factual basis for the injunction was no 
longer part of the case. Nor, as the majority pointed out, were 
the possible claims of individuals who had been held to be 
acting in concert with the defendants, because none of them 
were parties.
55
 Thus, much of Scalia’s opinion was devoted to 
legally irrelevant material. 
 
notice to petitioners and without any effort, however informal, to 
invite or permit their participation in the proceedings. 
Carroll, 393 U.S. at 180. 
 50. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 800. 
 51. Id. at 786–91 (videotape); 796–97 (evidence regarding individuals 
acting “in concert”); 804–12 (testimony about defendant’s conduct). 
 52. Id. at 808. 
 53. Id. at 796–97. 
 54. Id. at 770. 
 55. Id. at 775–76. 
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Perhaps the strongest sign that Justice Scalia was 
emotionally overwrought by the case was his accusation that 
the majority opinion reflected favoritism toward abortion 
advocates. Recall that the majority opinion was written by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, a strong opponent of abortion rights. 
So Scalia’s allegation of favoritism toward abortion providers 
seems to fall flat. 
This is not to say that the majority was necessarily right. 
Perhaps, as Scalia claimed, the standard should have been 
strict scrutiny, or perhaps, as Justice Stevens argued in a 
separate opinion, it should have been even more lenient than 
the Court’s standard.
56
 And the Court may or may not have 
been right in its application of the test. But Scalia’s diatribe 
against the Court seems to reflect more on his own emotional 
predispositions than on the majority’s. There is simply no 
evidence to believe that the Court was violating established 
precedent or violating normal procedures, whereas Scalia 
himself was at least guilty of the latter missteps by addressing 
issues that were not properly before the Court. 
The propriety of injunctions against anti-abortion 
protesters returned to the Court a few years later in Schenck v. 
Pro-Choice Network.
57
 The injunction in Schenck included two 
key restrictions: (1) floating buffer zones requiring individuals 
to stay fifteen feet away from those entering or leaving the 
facility, and (2) a fixed buffer zone fifteen feet from all 
entrances.
58
 Chief Justice Rehnquist once again delivered the 
opinion of the Court. The bone of contention with Justice Scalia 
involved the fixed buffer zone. Rehnquist found sufficient 
evidence for the trial judge to conclude that the only way to 
assure access was to move the demonstrators away from 
doorways and other entrances, particularly since the 
defendant’s harassment of police made it difficult for the police 




Rejecting the argument that a simple injunction against 
blocking physical access would be enough, Rehnquist found 
sufficient basis for the judge to “conclude that some of the 
defendants who were allowed within 5 to 10 feet of clinic 
 
 56. Id. at 778–79 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 57. 519 U.S. 357 (1997). 
 58. Id. at 366–67. 
 59. Id. 380–81. 
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entrances would not merely engage in stationary, non-
obstructive demonstrations but would continue to do what they 
had done before: aggressively follow and crowd individuals 
right up to the clinic door and refuse to move, or purposefully 
mill around parking lot entrances in an effort to impede or 
block the progress of cars.”
60
 The Court also found a basis for 
excluding sidewalk counselors in the fixed buffer zone because 




Justice Scalia’s angry dissent begins with a legal error, 
citing a rule governing review of administrative agencies 
instead of the contrary rule applying to review of judicial 
judgments.
62
 The reasoning of his dissent, unfortunately, was 
keyed to this incorrect standard. This may seem an obscure 
technicality to the uninitiated, but it is a surprisingly 
elementary legal mistake for an experienced appellate judge to 
make. 
Justice Scalia also excoriated the Court for considering the 
interest in public safety in assessing the case, on the theory 
that only the private interests of the plaintiff could be 
considered.
63
 In Scalia’s view, the case only involved a trespass 
on the abortion clinic’s property. Although the plaintiff also 
made a state civil rights claim, Justice Scalia found it 
incredible that anyone might think that blocking access to an 
abortion clinic raised a civil rights issue, and he also contended 
that the trial judge could not rely on public safety as the 
justification for an injunction against trespass.
64
 
Justice Scalia went to particular lengths to rebut the 
Court’s reliance on public safety as a justification for the 
injunction. Only the state executive, he said, could bring a 
claim based on public safety.
65
 As the Court pointed out, Justice 
Scalia seemed to be confusing whether the plaintiffs had a 
 
 60. Id. at 381–82. 
 61. Id. at 384–85. 
 62. Id. at 385 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The difference is that a court can 
only affirm an agency decision on the same argument the agency made, but it 
can affirm a lower court on the basis of different reasons. The majority cites 
the numerous precedents that deal with review of court orders. Id. at 384. As 
to how basic this rule is, I can only say that I learned it in the first week of my 
clerkship at a federal court of appeals. 
 63. Id. at 392–93. 
 64. Id. at 391. 
 65. Id. at 393–94. Given the ability of private plaintiffs to bring public 
nuisance cases, Scalia’s claim seems dubious on this score. 
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cause of action to protect public safety with whether, in 
response to a First Amendment defense, they could invoke 
public safety as a justification for the constitutionality of the 
injunction.
66
 Procedurally, these are two very different issues, 
and Scalia does nothing to explain why they should be treated 
identically. 
Scalia was clearly correct that the Court did not bend over 
backwards to uphold the defendants’ First Amendment claims 
in these cases, and he may have been right that it has done so 
in some other First Amendment cases. But it seems odd to 
accuse the Court of a grave misstep for judging a case 
objectively in one case simply because it failed to do so in some 
other cases. At the same time, as in the previous case, Scalia’s 
opinion seems to reflect procedural confusion that is not, one 
would hope, generally present in his opinions, and that could be 
taken as a sign of emotional involvement in the cases. 
B. STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON ABORTION PROTESTS 
The two most recent cases on abortion protesters involve 
statutory rather than injunctive restrictions. In Hill v. 
Colorado,
67
 a state law prohibited certain conduct within a 
hundred feet of a healthcare facility: knowingly intruding 
within eight feet of another person to pass out a leaflet, display 
a sign, or engage in “oral protest, education, or counseling.”
68
 
The majority opinion this time was written by Justice Stevens, 
not by Rehnquist, although Rehnquist joined the opinion. 
Justice Stevens concluded that the content-neutral test applied, 
that the government had a significant interest in protecting 
individuals using the clinic from unwanted speech,
69
 and that 
the restriction was narrowly tailored to that end.
70
 Justice 
Stevens argued that it would be difficult to apply a rule 
banning “harassment,” and that because of the subjective 
 
 66. Id. at 396 n.7. There seems to be authority contrary to Scalia’s 
position even in terms of the plaintiff’s claim for equitable relief, let alone in 
terms of rebutting a First Amendment defense. In Sierra Club v. Morton, the 
Court said: “The test of injury in fact goes only to the question of standing to 
obtain judicial review. Once this standing is established, the party may assert 
the interests of the general public in support of his claims for equitable relief.” 
405 U.S. 727, 740 n.15 (1972). 
 67. 530 U.S. 703 (2000). 
 68. Id. at 705. 
 69. Id. at 718. 
 70. Id. at 726–31. 
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nature of harassment, such a rule would offer less guidance to 
speakers than a broader, prophylactic rule.
71
 
Justice Scalia again dissented. He had “no doubt that this 
regulation would be deemed content-based in an instant if the 
case before us involved antiwar protesters, or union members 
seeking to ‘educate’ the public about the reasons for their 
strike.”
72
 The majority’s response was that the law’s reference 
to “oral protest, education, or counseling” was simply designed 
to eliminate casual conversations that would not interfere with 
building access.
73
 Rather than being aimed at the speaker’s 
message, the majority seemed to think that “oral protest, 
education, or counseling” really was aimed at buttonholing 
listeners, a type of behavior that might be identified visually 
with no knowledge of the speaker’s message. 
Today, I suspect, Scalia’s argument about the standard of 
review might prevail. As understood today, the requirement of 
content neutrality might require the state to ban even asking a 
person for the time if it wanted to prevent blatant verbal 
harassment. But even so, this would not affect the other 
aspects of the statute governing leafleting and picketing, which 
are clearly content-neutral. 
Justice Scalia also argued at length that the statute placed 
a heavy burden on the activities of sidewalk anti-abortion 
counselors. He may well have been right, but if the content-
neutral test applies, the validity of the law must be judged on 




Perhaps the clearest indication of the difference between 
the majority and the dissent is found in Justice Scalia’s 
dismissal of the rationale that “the statute aims to protect 
distraught women who are embarrassed, vexed, or harassed as 
they attempt to enter abortion clinics.”
75
 “If these are 
punishable acts,” he continued “they should be prohibited in 
those terms.”
76
 Note the “if”—Scalia apparently wanted to 
reserve the question of whether harassment of people trying to 
use a healthcare facility is a valid government concern. The 
majority clearly does think that harassment is a genuine 
 
 71. Id. at 729. 
 72. Id. at 742. 
 73. Id. at 722. 
 74. Id. at 779–91. 
 75. Id. at 776. 
 76. Id. 
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problem and that a prohibition phrased in terms of 
“harassment” would neither be workable (because of problems 
of proof) nor desirable (because it would fail to give speakers 
notice of when they cross the line of illegality). Scalia seems 
unable to grasp how anyone could hold that view. 
It is difficult to assess Scalia’s claim that the Court would 
have ruled differently in a case that did not involve abortion 
protests. Suppose, for instance, that the tables had been 
turned. Imagine that pro-choice protesters outside religiously 
affiliated hospitals were harassing people entering these 
hospitals because of the hospitals’ refusal to provide abortions. 
Would the majority then have struck down a law creating a 
buffer zone? Would Justice Scalia have been so dismissive of 
the reasons for the regulation? It seems impossible to know. 
Justice Scalia was equally incensed about the fourth of the 
abortion protests cases, despite the fact that the protestors won 
the case. In McCullen v. Coakley,
77
 a Massachusetts law banned 
knowingly standing on a sidewalk or street within thirty-five 
feet of any place, other than a hospital, where abortions were 
performed. In an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court 
struck down the law. It found the law to be content-neutral but 




Once again, Justice Scalia was incensed, saying that there 
is an “entirely separate, abridged edition of the First 
Amendment applicable to speech against abortion.”
79
 He faulted 
the Court for unnecessarily determining that the law was not 
content-based, which he said was gratuitous since the statute 
failed even the content-neutral test.
80
 He also said that it 
“blinks reality to say, as the majority does, that a blanket 
prohibition on the use of streets and sidewalks where speech on 
only one politically controversial topic is likely to occur—and 
where that speech can most effectively be communicated—is 
not content-based.”
81
 Perhaps so, but the Court had regularly 
blinked reality in past cases, as by finding in a landmark case 
 
 77. 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014). 
 78. Id. at 2530, 2537–41. 
 79. Id. at 2541. 
 80. Id. at 2541–42. The Court responded that this was not a departure 
from normal process and that in any event it could not determine whether 
less-intrusive alternatives were possible without deciding that they would be 
at least arguably constitutional themselves. Id. at 2530. 
 81. Id. at 2543. 
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that a law against burning draft cards was not aimed at the 
draft opponents who were the only ones engaging in this 
conduct.
82
 Scalia also said that the law was content-based 
because of the possibility that clinic employees, who were 
exempt from the restriction, might encourage women to get 
abortions,
83
 though this seems quite speculative as a basis for 
finding legislation to be content-based. Again, whatever the 
merits of Scalia’s argument, his rhetoric seems overwrought 
since the target of his attack is an opinion by Chief Justice 
Roberts, who is not a defender of abortion. Indeed, one scholar 
astutely suggests that the Court might well have been accused 
of bending the normally very lenient standard for narrow 
tailoring, warping its application against the government and 
in favor of the abortion protesters.
84
 
It is difficult to assess Scalia’s claim of bias since he points 
to no comparable non-abortion case. Suppose that Congress 
passed a law forbidding anyone from standing within thirty 
feet of a military recruiting office, with an exemption for the 
military recruiters themselves. Would the Court have held this 
law to be content-neutral and suggested some other, less 
restrictive alternatives? We cannot know, but it seems 
reasonably likely that it would have done so. Would Scalia have 
considered such a law content-based and found it invalid 
because of its impact on people trying to persuade potential 
recruits to avoid military service? There is, once again, no way 
of knowing, although Scalia seems utterly confident of how 
such hypothetical cases would be resolved (consistently by him, 
inconsistently by the majority). 
CONCLUSION 
In these cases involving abortion protesters, Justice Scalia 
accused the Court of ignoring well-established law in the 
interest of suppressing speakers with whom the majority 
disagreed. That was a serious accusation. It involved not only 
violation of the general judicial duty of impartiality and 
fairness toward all litigants, but also of the First Amendment’s 
own imperative of neutrality toward opposing viewpoints. 
 
 82. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 83. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2547 (2014). 
 84. See Leslie Kendrick, Nonsense on Sidewalks: Content Discrimination 
in McCullen v. Coakley, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 215, 239–40 (2015). 
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A close examination of the relevant cases suggests little 
support for this accusation, although it is never possible to say 
with confidence that a case was completely unaffected by the 
biases or ideologies of the judges. Indeed, in three of the cases, 
the charge of favoritism toward abortion advocates was not 
terribly plausible to begin with, given that three opinions were 
written by Justices who opposed abortion rights (and the fourth 
was joined by one of those Justices). Rather, examination of the 
cases suggests that Scalia’s own legal analysis may have been 
warped by his passionate endorsement of the protesters’ views. 
His sense of identification with the protestors may also have 
contributed to his attacks on the majority’s motives. In short, 
his own adherence to objective legal reasoning may have been 
weaker than he imagined, and that of his opponents stronger 
than he thought. 
Four cases involving a highly contentious issue do not 
provide a firm basis for drawing generalizations about a three-
decade judicial career. Yet, in a sense, it was Scalia himself 
who identified these cases as tests of judicial integrity and 
impartiality through the accusations he made against the 
majority. It is telling, then, that these accusations fell flat and 
to some extent may have rebounded against him. Like all of us, 
Justice Scalia might have done well to ask himself about the 
beam in his own eye before addressing the motes in the eyes of 
others.
85
 But this kind of self-reflection does not seem to have 
been a feature of his character. 
 
 
 85. “And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but 
considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye?” Matthew 7:3 (King James). 
